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ABSTRACT
Large networks service a significant number of endpoints, each of which access a
sizable number of applications. This results in the definition of access control policies that
are extremely lengthy and therefore difficult to render in common network elements, such
as routers and switches, due to the limited amount of memory (such as ternary contentaddressable memory (TCAM)) that is included in such platforms for the enforcement of
policies. To address the type of challenge that was described above, various solutions are
provided herein through several techniques. A first technique supports, among other things,
the scaling of the access control entries (ACEs) in a network for specific deployment by
converting an ACE to a route control entry. A second technique supports, among other
things, the disaggregation of access control policies and the efficient distribution of their
enforcement. According to this technique, access control attributes may be evaluated at
different network locations to optimize scale by localizing the evaluation of matching
criteria to the places in which it requires the minimum amount of state creation and
maintenance. A policy may be disaggregated at the orchestrator, its components may be
distributed to the different enforcement points, and a tagging mechanism may be used to
unify the policy as its elements are dispersed across multiple enforcement points.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The enforcement of access control policies on network platforms has traditionally
been limited by the capacity of the available memory (such as ternary content-addressable
memory (TCAM)) that is included in such platforms for the enforcement of policies. In
many cases, the length of the required policies may exceed the capacity of the available
TCAM. Consequently, a mechanism to enable the enforcement of very large access control
policies on standard routing platforms is desirable.
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Further, large networks service a significant number of endpoints, each of which
access a sizable number of applications. This results in the definition of access control
policies that are extremely long and therefore difficult to render in common network
elements (such as routers and switches) due to the limited capacity of hardware tables. One
approach that is employed by known solutions to such a challenge encompasses a grouping
of endpoints as a means of reducing and simplifying access control policies. Such an
approach classifies source endpoints into groups at the ingress of the network, includes
security or scalable group tags (SGTs) in the packet headers to reflect a group classification,
and defers the full enforcement of a policy to the egress of the network.
Although the logic that is employed in such an approach helps to alleviate the scale
problem, hot spots of large data structures in memory may still form in the network. This
is particularly true for systems in which the enforcement points are at points of traffic
aggregation in which the connectivity for many endpoints converges. Furthermore, there
are operations (in, for example, defense networks) in which a grouping of endpoints is not
an accepted practice but the rendering of granular policies on a per-prefix basis is required.
There are scalability improvements that may be pursued by disaggregating, restructuring,
and distributing the classification criteria matching process and the enforcement of
associated policy actions.
To address the types of challenges that were described above, various solutions are
provided herein through several techniques. Each of the techniques will be briefly
introduced below and then described in detail later in the instant narrative.
A first technique supports, among other things, a method for the enforcement of
very large access control policies that does not depend upon the TCAM capacity that is
available in a platform. Rather, the technique leverages the forwarding table capacity of
the platform which is a much larger memory table. Consequently, this technique leverages
the possibility of enforcing an access control policy in the routing plane in order to avoid
the scale limitations of the TCAM-based access control enforcement tables that are
normally available in a router.
Certain enterprise entities are pursuing a native zero-trust-like environment within
their own private networks. One example of such a deployment can be found in networks
that are built for national defense departments in which a central information technology
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(IT) provider services a multitude of independent federal agencies and other operations
over which they have no control. In such an environment, it is required that access control
policies be enforced at ingress and at the edges of the IT provider's network in order to
secure the flow of traffic at the closest point of control that is managed by the central IT
provider.
Each agency that is connected to the central IT provider will have a large number
of endpoints (in one particular example, more than 15,000), with each endpoint being
capable of accessing a relatively rich mix of applications (e.g., on average 80 or more on
each endpoint). For operational and compliance reasons, it is required that access control
policies be defined on a per-endpoint basis and that access control policies follow a
whitelist model in which only the traffic that is explicitly permitted is allowed to enter the
network.
The net effect of above requirements is that the edge routers and the devices of the
central IT provider's network need to be able to classify traffic for thousands of endpoints
and they need to accommodate access control entries in excess of one million entries
resulting in a very granular micro-segmented environment.
Aspects of this technique address the latter of the above-described challenges – i.e.,
the need to enforce millions of policy entries on common routing platforms. While route
control to provide access control has been used for macro-segmentation with virtual routing
and forwarding (VRF) solutions and virtual private networks (VPNs), aspects of the
presented techniques support a mechanism for delivering micro-segmentation within such
macro-segments (e.g., VRFs) while still leveraging route control in smaller forwarding
contexts within the VRFs.
A second technique, as referenced above, supports, among other things, a method
for the disaggregation of the policy enforcement, thus delivering improved scalability.
Aspects of this technique disaggregate a policy and separate the evaluation of endpoints
from the evaluation of traffic types. In contrast, some existing network access provisioning
and management solutions evaluate these criteria jointly at egress, restricting the ability to
distribute enforcement and scale. More importantly, aspects of the presented technique do
not have a hard dependency on the grouping of endpoints, which allows for the deployment
of large-scale policies that are articulated in terms of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
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(rather than source groups) in a distributed manner without requiring larger memory tables
on the network devices.
Turning to the first technique, as referenced above, aspects of this technique support,
among other things, assigning to each user a dedicated forwarding context or table, steering
all of the traffic from that user through its dedicated forwarding context (e.g., microsegment), and constraining the routes that may be installed on that table to only the routes
for the applications that the specific user is allowed to access. Aspects of the presented
technique supports a method by which micro-segments (forwarding contexts) are
instantiated, the way in which micro-segments are efficiently populated with routes that
are reflective of a policy, the relationship of such micro-segments to their parent VRF, and
the mechanisms by which traffic may be multiplexed and demultiplexed into and out of the
different micro-segments.
Within the presented technique resides the concept of constraining the routes that
are available to each user, rather than programming a comprehensive access control list
(ACL) on an edge router, to convert an access control policy into a route policy. At a high
level, the presented technique encompasses assigning a dedicated forwarding context to
each user so that all of the traffic to and from that user is handled through the user's
dedicated forwarding table and constraining the routes that are present in each per-user
forwarding table (VRF) to only those routes for the specific applications that a user is
allowed to access.
According to aspects of this technique, each endpoint is assigned its own
forwarding context and the information that is contained in each forwarding context is
limited to only the destinations that the endpoint is allowed to reach. Thus, an endpoint
will have its reachability constrained to only those destinations that are available in its
forwarding context. Whether a destination is permitted or not is defined by the access
control policy for the endpoint. This yields a level of forwarding segmentation that is much
more granular than that which is achieved through VRFs and the micro-segments exist
within the coarser structure of a VRF (or a virtual local area network (VLAN) in a Layer 2
(L2) implementation).
The access control policy that is enforced follows a whitelist model in which only
those communications which are explicitly allowed are permitted. In order to achieve this
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level of micro-segmentation, several mechanisms must be implemented (according to
aspects of the first technique as described below) beyond the general notion of forwardingbased micro-segmentation, where the below-described mechanisms enhance the
forwarding path and the population of routes in order to achieve the proposed microsegmentation based on forwarding information.
Aspects of the first technique may be further explicated through six functional
blocks, each of which will be described below.
A first functional block encompasses micro-context creation and assignment logic.
For each endpoint IP address that is discovered at the boundary router for a system, a
forwarding micro-context may be created as an indexed section of the forwarding table.
The index may be derived through a simple heuristic or by a more sophisticated mapping
function or service. As just one example, the index may be the actual IP address of the
endpoint for which the micro-context is created, resulting in a simple one-to-one mapping
between endpoints and micro-contexts. Under a more involved example, endpoints may be
grouped and the endpoints in a group may share a micro-context. In such a case, the index
may be a group number and the endpoint assignment may be a mapping function between
the list of endpoint IP addresses and the group to which they belong (and the group's index).
The micro-contexts may be nested within a VRF and may be used for the enforcement of
policy, but they do not replace the VRF for the purposes of forwarding. Thus, VPNs are
not established amongst micro-contexts on different routers as they would be established
amongst VRFs on different routers.
A second functional block encompasses the translation of an access control policy
into contexts and routes and the population of micro-contexts. Access control policies may
be articulated in terms of the involved endpoints (e.g., a source and a destination), the type
of traffic that flows between the endpoints (e.g., a classifier), and the action that is to be
taken (e.g., permit, deny, or other). In order to take an action, there must first be a match
on the tuple of source and destination endpoint addresses and classifier information.
According to aspects of this technique, a source address match is achieved through the
demultiplexing mechanisms (that are explained below in connection with a third functional
block) in which all of the traffic originating from a particular source may be steered to a
specific micro-context. A destination address match is achieved through a destination
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lookup within the micro-context. A classifier match may also be achieved through the
demultiplexing mechanisms (as explained below). A deny action may be implemented by
excluding a destination from the micro-context of a source. A permit action may be
implemented by including a destination within the micro-context of a source. A redirect
action may be implemented by altering the next hop for the destination that was found
within the micro-context (i.e., this is an override of the forwarding action that is described
below in connection with a fourth functional block).
A policy may be maintained in the control plane of a network, which is preferably
a demand-based control plane such as that which is found in the Location Identifier
Separation Protocol (LISP). The actions of permit and deny may be associated with the
response that the mapping system provides to a query at lookup time, thus the inclusion or
exclusion of a route in a micro-context in order to implement an action is enforced by the
control plane at the time of responding to a query for the resolution of a destination (in the
context of a particular source).
A third functional block encompasses the demultiplexing of clear IP external traffic
into micro-contexts (based on a source IP address (i.e., an ingress point)). For example, the
boundary router to a system will receive clear IP traffic (i.e., traffic without specific
metadata) from external networks and will need to steer the traffic that originated from
different endpoints into their corresponding micro-context. In order to achieve this, the
source IP address of the packet may be treated as a label that indicates to the receiving
router which micro-context should be used to evaluate the action that is to be taken on the
packet. The concept is similar to how an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) 802.1Q standard (dot1Q) tag is used to associate traffic in a trunk port to a particular
VLAN. However, under aspects of the first technique the existing source IP address is
employed rather than a separate tag. The implication is that any IP system can connect to
this type of interface without requiring any special configuration to achieve the
demultiplexing. Since the interface that is facing the external network is a Layer 3 (L3)
interface, it will have an IP address. This continues to be a single interface with a single IP
address and is independent of the instantiation of the micro-contexts (i.e., the creation of
micro-contexts does not imply the creation of a dedicated external-facing L3 sub-interface
for each micro-context).
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The above-described mechanism may be enhanced to include Layer 4 (L4)
information in the packet as part of the tag that may be used to demultiplex into a particular
micro-context, resulting in a somewhat longer tag. Matching L4 information does come at
the cost of a larger number of micro-contexts as each micro-context would be unique to
the combination of a source IP address plus L4 (source and destination) information. By
using the combination as a tag to demultiplex into the appropriate micro-context, the match
on source IP address as well as traffic type (i.e., a classifier) may be achieved.
A fourth functional block encompasses the multiplexing of micro-contexts into a
parent VRF. For example, all of the micro-segments that are associated with a parent VRF
as micro-segments do not replace VRFs but exist within them. All of the routing
information is actually contained in the VRF, and the micro-segments are used solely to
determine if a packet should be forwarded or not.
Once a packet is assigned a micro-context and a destination lookup is completed in
the micro-context, a packet will be handled in one of three ways. First, it may be dropped
if there is no destination match. Second, it may be linked to a parent VRF for routing if
there is a destination match. And third, it may be linked to a re-direct route in the parent
VRF if there is a destination match and the action is re-direct.
Implementations of the above may approach the creation of the state in the microcontexts and a parent VRF differently. For example, one approach may link partial entries
in the micro-context to full route entries in the parent VRF, through which a match in the
micro-context would result in a pointer to a full route in the parent VRF.
A fifth functional block encompasses route population and forwarding table state
reduction. One concern with aspects of the first technique concerns the proliferation of
routes that are stored multiple times across multiple micro-contexts. Two approaches may
be employed to minimize this impact (all the while keeping in mind that the main goal is
moving the lengthy ACE state to the forwarding table). A first approach includes the use
of partial entries in the micro-context and pointers to the full state in the parent VRF (as
described above in connection with the fourth functional flock). Under a second approach,
the routes may be procured on-demand rather than pushed everywhere.
The on-demand approach implies that both the micro-context and the parent VRF
do not have any routes cached at time zero. When a packet arrives for a new destination, a
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lookup in a demand-based routing system may be initiated (e.g., a map-request to a LISP
mapping system). The mapping system may respond based on the policy. In order to do so,
the map-request must include the destination IP address along with the source IP address
so that the policy may be evaluated in the mapping system in order to respond with a valid
route or respond with a deny action. The response may be used to populate the microcontext that originated the request as well as the parent VRF. If an entry already exists in
the parent VRF, the entry will be refreshed. When a deny action is met, preexisting entries
in the parent VRF will not be overridden, but the route would be excluded from the
requesting micro-segment in order to effectively render the policy without impacting the
routing for other sources.
Finally, a sixth functional block encompasses the forwarding of traffic at egress.
No special considerations are required for traffic that is being decapsulated. All of the
enforcement is done at ingress and once a policy is enforced the regular forwarding ensues.
It is important to note that the first technique, as described in the above narrative,
does not attempt to address the problem of enforcing micro-segmentation within or across
VRFs, nor does it map subnets to SGTs or steer traffic towards security enforcement
service nodes. However, such steering is possible, such as steering the request to a portal
of a ‘deny’ splash page using a returned next hop Routing Locator (RLOC). In some
instances, this RLOC could also be a security device, inserted in the path via policy.
Aspects of the first technique focus on providing a mechanism for the scalable rendering
of access control policies on a router or switch by leveraging the hardware forwarding
tables (which are very large) and avoiding the use of the security TCAM-based tables
(which are very small and limited). In contrast, some existing solutions render access
control policies as Security Group Access Control Lists (SGACLs) in the (limited) security
TCAM-based tables.
Additionally, under the first technique the rulesets may be large, but they are
anticipated fitting into the forwarding tables. Alternatively, the rules may be stored in the
control and management plane (i.e., a cloud) and computed there, with the result (e.g., a
prefix, or no prefix, or redirect) being sent to the endpoint VRF table and stored in M-trie
rather than in TCAM. This leads to the selective on-demand distribution of rules, which
significantly reduces the amount of state at any particular enforcement point and provides
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the technique with solid horizontal scale attributes. The prefixed are retrieved on an ondemand basis, further increasing the scale as compared to a SGACL push and limiting the
rules that are required at an endpoint. The rules may be considered host routes and it could
be argued that due to the demand-based nature, the technique can scale as user endpoints
(e.g., devices) are accessed.
The implementation of the forwarding tables (specially the hardware
implementation) may be optimized in the future with this concept in mind by creating an
indexing mechanism that is lighter and nimbler than the one that is currently used to
partition VRFs. However, this would represent a scaling optimization and it is not a hard
requirement for the implementation of aspects of the first technique.
Aspects of the first technique were previously explicated through six functional
blocks. In connection with those functional blocks, it is important to note the following
functionalities – the assignment of a dedicated forwarding context for each source (e.g.,
user); the programming of constrained forwarding into the per-user context according to
the access control policies; the translation of access control policies into contexts and
"pseudo-routes;" the decoupling of the dedicated forwarding contexts from the overall
forwarding table (this is not a VRF in the routing sense); a mechanism for the
demultiplexing of plain IP traffic into the appropriate micro-context; the multiplexing of
the micro-contexts (with the pseudo-routes) into full blown VRFs (with proper routes); and
a demand-based model that leads to the reduction in the forwarding state that would be
created at the enforcement points.
Turning to the second technique, as referenced above, aspects of this technique
support, among other things, a disaggregation of the components of the policy and a
distribution of the evaluation of the different components of the policy to places in the
network where the amount of state that is required for the evaluation of each component of
the policy is minimized due to the nature of the path that different traffic flows may follow.
For example, source and destination addresses may be matched at the branches (i.e., the
spokes) of a wide area network (WAN) while traffic types may be matched at the hub of
the same WAN, thus reducing the number of variables that must be evaluated at the points
of traffic convergence while distributing the evaluation of large state tables (comprising,

9
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2022

6760
10

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 5149 [2022]

for example, source and destination IP addresses) to the branches and spokes where the
state is naturally scaled horizontally.
Consequently, a canonical access policy may be disaggregated into the following
components or variables – a source endpoint address, a destination endpoint address, a
traffic type (which is usually the L4 classification criteria of a source port, a destination
port, and a protocol but which could be expanded to include L4 through Layer 7 (L7)
criteria depending upon the capabilities of the network device), and an action (such as
permit, deny, redirect, etc.).
With a policy disaggregated into its components, aspects of the second technique
support the evaluation of the components in phases with the phases being completed at
different network locations where the amount of state that is required to evaluate the
corresponding variables may be minimized. In order to complete such a phased evaluation
(or enforcement) without a loss of context, aspects of the presented technique support the
use of tags that identify the context that was derived at an initial phase so that it may be
leveraged in a subsequent phase of the enforcement process.
While the above description focused on standard access control policies and
employed two phases, it is important to note that the second technique may be expanded
to other policies (such as traffic engineering policies) and may involve more than two
phases. In the context of access control policies, aspects of the presented technique enable
the enforcement of whitelist policies in two phases. Under a whitelist policy access is
denied by default and permission must be explicitly stated as part of the policy.
As noted above, aspects of the second technique may encompass two phases of
evaluation and enforcement. The first phase matches on source and destination endpoint
addresses. This phase focuses on identifying the contract that governs the connection
between the matched source and destination. A contract identifier (e.g., a Policy-ID) may
be associated with the flow at this stage and no policy may be enforced unless the whitelist
implies a deny action. Further, the second phase parses the remaining parameters in the
tuple of the packet header (beyond the source and destination IP addresses) to complete the
evaluation of the disaggregated policy. This phase evaluates the traffic type (e.g., L4
information) in the packet header and compares it to the L4 profile that would match the
Policy-ID that was derived in the first phase.
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The enforcement elements in Phases 1 and 2 must have knowledge of the PolicyIDs and how the Policy-IDs are mapped to different values of the policy components and
variables that they are to evaluate. This implies that the policy is defined as a series of
"contracts," each of which specify a combination of source and destination L3 and L4
information and an associated action. Each contract may be identified with a Policy-ID,
which may in turn have a contract tag value. While a contract tag value may be identical
to the policy-ID value, a possible difference between the Policy-ID namespace and the tag
namespace is highlighted as it may allow for implementation flexibility. The policy
orchestrator or controller must distribute the different components of the contracts to the
different enforcement points. In doing so, the context of the Policy-ID must be associated
with all policy components that are distributed. Different enforcement points will receive
different portions of the disaggregated policy (overall, they are linked together by the
Policy-ID as the policy is distributed). For the purposes of distributed enforcement, a Phase
1 enforcer must include the contract tag corresponding to the Policy-ID that is identified
on each packet that it forwards. A Phase 2 enforcer will receive the packets and evaluate
the remaining policy components in the context of the Policy-ID that is specified by the
contract tag.
Aspects of the second technique may be further explicated through a simple
heuristic. For example, consider that a match may be attempted first on a source, which if
successful will point to a subset of the destinations that are permitted. Next, a match may
be attempted on a destination (from the subset in the previous step). If no match is found,
then the process may be exited and a default action (such as deny in a whitelist model) may
be applied. A successful source-destination match will result in a pointer to a Policy-ID
which may then be encoded in the traffic that is forwarded in a distributed system as a
contract tag. The Policy-ID will point to a list of traffic types (defined by an L4-L7 tuple),
which may be referred to as a contract, which specifies the different traffic types that will
be matched for the particular Policy-ID. Contracts may also specify the action that is to be
taken upon a match.
Next, a match may be attempted on one or more of the entries in a contract based
on the Policy-ID and the policy component left to the second phase (i.e., the L4 port
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numbers in the above example). Finally, a policy action (such as permit, redirect, or deny)
for the matching entry may be enforced.
The matching and enforcing functions may be distributed to the routers in which
the size of the memory tables with the possible matches can be minimized. Generally, the
match on source-destination IP addresses would be done at an ingress router (e.g., a WAN
branch router) while the match and enforcement on the entries within a contract would be
done at an egress router (closer to the destination at a hub aggregation site in a WAN).
Such an approach has the benefit of leveraging the horizontal scale that a network naturally
achieves in a fan-out topology.
It is important to note that whenever a policy is disaggregated and distributed there
are extra challenges concerning the monitoring and the correlation of the information for
visibility purposes. Using the example that was presented above, distributed monitoring
(according to aspects of the second technique) may work in the following manner.
When a source is matched and it points to a subset of destinations, there are two
cases of interest. In a first case, permission is allowed between the source and a destination
at a branch resulting in a Policy-ID. The capture of monitoring information at the branch
for this traffic may be ignored since it is known when this traffic will arrive at the hub
where the application of a policy based on the derived Policy-ID allows for the capture of
the (source, destination, application, policy, etc.) monitoring information. As a result, this
is a positive case for monitoring and visibility purposes as no information in the packet is
lost.
In a second case, permission is denied between the source and destination resulting
in a traffic drop at the branch. In this case the traffic is being dropped before an L4 or L7
rule as the decision to drop the packets occurs at the branch router based on partial
information. As a result, this is a problematic case and there are two solutions that may be
considered.
A first solution encompasses depicting the chain of visibility, where it is shown
how the traffic was dropped (i.e., based on a source and a destination at a branch, and then
applying a Policy-ID at a hub). Thus, a user will still obtain some visibility (though in this
case the user loses some amount of granularity and visibility). A second solution, which is
described below, addresses the full visibility problem.
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Under a second solution, for dropped traffic at a branch, application statistics
(including a source, a destination, an application type, and other required information) may
be collected using a packet inspection facility and then exported to a controller. Using a
correlation between the tuples that were learned from the branch and the policy rules it is
possible to match the statistics and add to the data that was derived from the hub and thus
obtain an aggregate view on the controller leading to fully visibility and monitoring. By
employing the extra correlation logic that was described above it is possible to obtain a
highly scalable policy with limited resources along with monitoring and visibility.
In summary, in support of long access control policies various solutions have been
provided herein through several techniques. A first technique supports, among other things,
the scaling of the access control entries (ACEs) in a network for specific deployment by
converting an ACE to a route control entry. A second technique supports, among other
things, the disaggregation of access control policies and the efficient distribution of their
enforcement. According to this technique, access control attributes may be evaluated at
different network locations to optimize scale by localizing the evaluation of matching
criteria to the places in which it requires the minimum amount of state creation and
maintenance. A policy may be disaggregated at the orchestrator, its components may be
distributed to the different enforcement points, and a tagging mechanism may be used to
unify the policy as its elements are dispersed across multiple enforcement points.
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